Ideas from 'Truth and Ontology' by Trenton Merricks [2007], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth and Ontology' by Merricks,Trenton [OUP 2007,978-0-19-920523-3]].
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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14415
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A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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14408
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Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
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14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
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14403
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If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
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14400
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If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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14394
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It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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14412
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Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
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14391
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If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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14419
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Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
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14393
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The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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14413
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Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
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14416
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An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
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14392
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Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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14410
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You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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14417
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Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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14402
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If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
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14406
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Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
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14407
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Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
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14411
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Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
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14405
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How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
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